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In 1985 in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,' the Supreme Court con-
sidered the due process rights of plaintiffs seeking money damages in
a class action. The majority of the plaintiffs in Shutts lacked minimum
contacts with the forum, and the Supreme Court held that due pro-
cess entitled these plaintiffs to a right to opt out of the class.2 The
scope of this holding was unclear. In a footnote, the Supreme Court
expressly limited the holding of Shutts to claims for monetary relief,
leaving open the issue of due process rights in equitable class actions.
Furthermore, the Court did not clarify whether due process guaran-
teed opt-out rights only to absent plaintiffs or to all class action plain-
tiffs seeking monetary relief.
In 1993 and again in 1996, the Supreme Court granted writs of
certiorari to cases confronting the questions left open by Shutts.3 Un-
1 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
2 To "opt out" is to withdraw voluntarily from the class in order to bring claims
independently.
3 The Supreme Court granted writs of certiorari in Ticor Title Insurance Co. v.
Brown, 510 U.S. 810 (1993), and in Adams v. Robertson, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996).
In Thor, plaintiff groups brought antitrust claims against Ticor Insurance Com-
pany in federal court seeking treble damages and injunctive relief. The parties set-
tled, but a few plaintiffs argued that they were not bound by the settlement since the
court had not provided them a right to opt out. The Ninth Circuit read Shutts as
requiring a due process right to opt out if monetary claims are involved. Conse-
quently, it held that plaintiffs should be able to relitigate the monetary, though not
the injunctive, claims. See Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1992).
The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to review the Ninth Circuit's
decision, Ticor, 510 U.S. at 810, but then dismissed the writ as improvidently granted.
See Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S. 117 (1994). The Court held that the certi-
fied question was of no general consequence because whether or not absent class
members have a constitutional right to opt out of the action for monetary relief, they
have a right to do so under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Consequently, there
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fortunately, the Supreme Court ultimately dismissed both writs as im-
providently granted due to procedural and prudential concerns.
4
When dismissing the second writ, however, the Court made clear that
it has a "continuing interest" in resolving the Shutts issue.5 It will likely
not be long before the Court is presented with another opportunity to
decide whether mandatory class actions, regardless of whether they
bind resident or non-resident plaintiffs, violate the Due Process
Clause and are therefore unconstitutional, or whether there are some
instances in which fairness to the class as a whole and to the public
authorizes unitary disposition.6
This Note examines the three approaches the Supreme Court
may employ to decide the constitutionality of mandatory class actions:
the Court may look solely to precedent; it may look to the purpose of
adjudication; or it may adopt a test which balances efficiency and con-
stitutional concerns in individual cases.
Part II discusses the role of precedent, namely the facts and appli-
cability of Shutts to the mandatory class issue. The Note shows that in
the future, the Court may interpret its opinion in Shutts to guarantee a
due process right to control one's own litigation or, alternatively, only
to protect absent plaintiffs from the dangers of distant forum abuse.
Shutts does not clearly resolve whether mandatory class actions by defi-
was no need to reach the constitutional question, and the question presented was
hypothetical to everyone but the actual litigants. See id.
In Adams, a nationwide class sued Liberty National Life Insurance Company for
fraudulently inducing policyholders to exchange old cancer insurance policies for
new ones. The parties reached a settlement which precluded class members from
suing Liberty National for fraud based on its insurance policy program. SeeAdams v.
Robertson, 676 So. 2d 1265 (Ala. 1995). Some objectors to the settlement appealed.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of whether the certification
and settlement of claims for both monetary and equitable relief, without an opportu-
nity to opt out of the class, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Adams, 117 S. Ct. at 37. After oral argument, the Supreme Court dismissed the
writ as improvidently granted because the petitioner failed to properly present the
certified question to the Alabama Supreme Court. SeeAdams v. Robertson, 117 S. Ct.
1028 (1997).
4 See supra note 3.
5 Adams, 117 S. Ct. at 1032 n.6.
6 The Supreme Court may even address this issue as early as next term. The
intervenors in Ahearn v. Tanagan, 90 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1996) have petitioned the
Court for a writ of certiorari to resolve the question: Is a class action properly certified
as a mandatory, non opt-out proceeding when that proceeding seeks to resolve tort
claims for damages? 65 U.S.L.W. 3611 (1996). In Ahearn, the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit upheld a mandatory class settlement of asbestos claims. The trial
court had certified the class as a Rule 23(b) (1) (B) class on the theory that the defend-
ant's assets constituted a limited fund. See infra text accompanying note 54.
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nition offend due process and are therefore unconstitutional in all
cases. Part III examines the debate about the purpose of adjudication
and the shift from our tradition of "individual rights" to an increased
focus on "group interests." In deciding the fate of the mandatory class
action, the Court will prioritize our procedural values with respect to
private and public interests. Part IV introduces two balancing tests
which the Supreme Court might use to determine the constitutional-
ity of mandatory classes in individual cases. These balancing tests con-
sider efficiency concerns in relation to the tension between individual
and group interests and allowjudges to determine the amount of pro-
cess due to plaintiffs on a case-by-case basis. Using efficiency as a base-
line provides an alternative to holding mandatory class certification
constitutional or unconstitutional in every instance; depending on the
costs and benefits involved, denying a right to opt out may or may not
deny a litigant due process. Finally, Part V concludes that the
Supreme Court should hold mandatory classes unconstitutional in all
cases. Ultimately, the constitutionality of mandatory class actions is a
choice between group fairness and individual rights. Our constitu-
tional guarantee of due process, which ensures individual liberty in
the face of contrary collective action, compels the Supreme Court to
leave control of an individual's chose in action, a cognizable property
interest, with the individual.
II. SHT"TS AS PRECEDENT
To decide the constitutionality of mandatory class actions, the
Supreme Court will likely first revisit Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts.7 In
Shutts, the Court considered how much due process protection a state
court must afford a member of an opt-out class before adjudicating
her rights. In footnote three of this decision, however, the Court lim-
ited the holding to class actions "wholly or predominantly for money
judgments";8 it gave no guidance concerning other types of class ac-
tions, including those for equitable relief. Consequently, whether
Shutts speaks to the constitutionality of mandatory class actions de-
pends upon how one interprets the Supreme Court's opinion.
A. The Facts of Shutts
In Shutts, gas company investors commenced a class action in
Kansas state court to recover interest due on suspended royalties.
Only a small minority of the class members were Kansas residents; the
7 472 U.S. 797 (1985):
8 Id. at 811 n.3. - -
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remaining plaintiffs lived throughout all fifty states and several foreign
countries. Similarly, only a small fraction of the affected lands were in
Kansas; the majority of the affected lands were in Oklahoma and
Texas, and eleven states were represented in the lease holdings.9
The trial court preliminarily certified the class as an opt-out class
under Rule 23 of the Kansas Rules of Civil Procedure, which is identi-
cal to the corresponding Federal Rule. After the class was certified,
the class representatives provided each class member with notice
through first class mail in accordance with Rule 23(c). The notice
described the action and informed each class member that she could
appear in person or by counsel; otherwise, she would be represented
by the named plaintiffs. The notices also stated that class members
would be bound by the judgment in the class action unless they opted
out of the lawsuit by executing and returning a "request for exclusion"
that was included with the notice.1 0 After an appropriate period of
time had passed, the trial court certified the final class, the case went
to trial, and the trial court held Phillips Petroleum liable for prejudg-
ment and posjudgment interest on the suspended royalties."
On appeal, Phillips Petroleum argued that the Kansas trial court
did not have personal jurisdiction over absent plaintiff class members
as required by International Shoe.12 It argued that the opt-out notice to
absent class members, which forced them to return the request for
exclusion in order to avoid the suit, was insufficient to bind class
members who were not residents of Kansas or who did not possess
"minimum contacts" with Kansas.13
The Kansas Supreme Court reasoned that because the absent
class members were plaintiffs, not defendants, the traditional mini-
mum contacts analysis of International Shoe did not apply. Instead, the
court held that due process only entitled nonresident class-action
9 See id. at 799-801.
10 Id. at 801.
11 See id. at 801-02.
12 International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). International Shoe held
that for a court to assert personal jurisdiction over an absent defendant, due process
requires only that the defendant have certain minimum contacts with the forum such
that maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice. Id. at 316.
Phillips Petroleum had standing to challenge the court's jurisdiction over the
plaintiff class because it had a "direct and substantial personal interest" in ensuring
that the plaintiffs would be bound by the court's decision. If Kansas did not possess
jurisdiction over the plaintiffs, Phillips could be subject to numerous individual suits
in addition to any judgment rendered in the class action. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 805.
13 Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 679 P.2d 1159, 1170 (Kan. 1984), rev'd, 472
U.S. 797 (1985).
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plaintiffs to adequate notice, an opportunity to be heard, an opportu-
nity to opt out of the class, and adequate representation by the named
plaintiffs. Because these procedural due process minima were met,
the court held that Kansas could assert jurisdiction over the plaintiff
class and bind each class member with a judgment on her claim.'
4
Phillips Petroleum petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari, and the Court granted review.
B. Shutts in the United States Supreme Court
In the Supreme Court Phillips again argued that under Interna-
tional Shoe, Kansas could not adjudicate the claims of out-of-state plain-
tiffs unless the plaintiffs had minimum contacts with the forum or the
plaintiffs consented to jurisdiction. 15 Many of the plaintiffs had no
minimum contacts with the forum, and Phillips argued that a failure
to execute and return the "request for exclusion" form could not con-
stitute affirmative consent. Consequently, Phillips claimed, by adjudi-
cating the rights of out-of-state class members, the Kansas courts had
violated the plaintiffs' due process rights.'
6
The Supreme Court disagreed with Phillips and affirmed the de-
cision of the Kansas Supreme Court on this issue. The Court con-
trasted the "substantial" burdens imposed upon a defendant haled
into an out-of-state forum with the fact that an absent class-action
plaintiff is "not required to do anything" and "may sit back and allow
the litigation to run its course, content in knowing that there are safe-
guards provided for his protection."1 7 The Court concluded that "the
Due Process Clause need not and does not afford [absent class plain-
tiffs] as much protection from state court jurisdiction as it does [ab-
sent defendants]."18 Consequently, the requisite constitutional
minima are met if an absent class plaintiff receives notice; an opportu-
nity to be heard and participate in the litigation, whether in person or
through counsel; "an opportunity to remove himself from the class by
executing and returning an 'opt-out' or 'request for exclusion' form
to the court"; and adequate representation by the named plaintiff at
all times.' 9
The Supreme Court limited this holding to class actions which
seek to bind known plaintiffs concerning claims wholly or predomi-
14 See id. at 1171.
15 See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 806.
16 See id.
17 I& at 810.
18 I& at 811.
19 Id- at 812.
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nantly for moneyjudgments. In footnote three of the Shutts opinion,
the Court stated that it "intimate [d] no view concerning other types of
class actions, such as those seeking equitable relief."20 This footnote,
and ambiguous language as to whether the Shutts holding applies to
plaintiffs who possess minimum contacts with the forum, have given
rise to varying interpretations of the holding in Shutts.
C. Two Interpretations of Shutts
1. Shutts Guarantees a Due Process Right to Control One's Own
Litigation
One way to read Shutts is as a case affirming an individual's due
process right to control her own litigation in cases for monetary re-
lief.21 Under this interpretation, it is irrelevant that most of the plain-
tiffs in Shutts were absent plaintiffs lacking minimum contacts with the
forum because Shutts protects the individual control of all plaintiffs
seeking monetary relief, regardless of whether they have minimum
contacts.
Some of the language of Shutts supports this "individual control"
reading. In Shutts, the Court acknowledged the due process dangers
inherent in mandatory class actions by pointing out that a "chose in
action is a constitutionally recognized property interest possessed by
each of the plaintiffs," 22 and that sometimes the claim will be "suffi-
ciently large or important that he wishes to litigate it on his own.
'23
If the Court agrees that Shutts was a case about individual claim
autonomy, it must then decide whether to extend its holding in Shutts
to claims for equitable relief and prohibit mandatory classes alto-
gether. Under the individual control reading of Shutts, the Court
would likely take this extra step and extend Shutts because making a
plaintiffs due process right to individual control contingent upon the
type of relief she seeks would be inconsistent and unfair.
Still, an originalist like Justice Scalia might find Shutts applicable
to the problem of mandatory classes and yet decline to extend its
holding to claims for equitable relief.24 Although Shutts under the
20 Id. at 811 n.3.
21 See Arthur R. Miller & David Crump, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Multistate
Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 96 YALE L.J. 1, 54-55 (1986).
22 Shutts, 472 U.S. at 807.
23 Id. at 813.
24 The originalist position rests upon the belief thatjudges must glean their inter-
pretation of the Constitution from "the most specific level at which a relevant tradi-
tion protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified."
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989). ForJustice Scalia and other
1632 [VOL- 72:5
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"individual control" reading may mandate opt-out rights for plaintiffs
seeking monetary relief, the history of the Fourteenth Amendment
does not require such a right for plaintiffs seeking equitable relief.
2 5
The class action developed from the English equitable bill of peace
which was a means of preventing multiple suits concerning common
questions. If certain prerequisites were met, all parties, named and
unnamed, were bound by the action; a group member could not ex-
clude himself or opt out.26 Justice Scalia and other originalists would
likely interpret the Fourteenth Amendment in light of this history and
conclude that because mandatory classes in equity comported with
due process when the Amendment was passed in 1868, they remain
constitutional today. Accordingly, originalists would decline to ex-
tend the "individual control" reading of Shutts to claims for predomi-
nantly equitable relief.
Shutts, then, may or may not provide an answer to the problem of
mandatory classes. If the Supreme Court decides that its opinion in
Shutts gave constitutional status to the right to opt out in all cases, not
just when there is a danger of distant forum abuse, then in the interest
of consistency and fairness the Court will likely overcome the original-
ist argument and extend the holding in Shutts to include equitable as
well as monetary claims.
2. Shutts Protects Absent Plaintiffs from Distant Forum Abuse
The Supreme Court, alternatively, may decide that Shutts merely
protects absent plaintiffs from distant forum abuse.27 In Shutts, the
Court rejected Phillips Petroleum's claim that Kansas could not exer-
cise jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims unless they had sufficient
minimum contacts with the state or consented to jurisdiction by opt-
ing into the class. The minimum contacts test, the Court reasoned,
originalists, the text of the Constitution and its overall structure, along with the origi-
nal understanding of the text, are the only sources of "theoretical legitimacy." See
generally Antonin Scalia, Oiiginalism" The Lesser Evi 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849 (1989).
The originalists believe that history is the most "specific" level of generality and there-
fore best preserves the meaning of the Constitution. Id.
25 See 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MIER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1751 (2d ed. 1986).
26 See id.
27 See In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, 960 F.2d 285, 292 (2d Cir. 1992)
(stating that Shutts requires only "that a plaintiff be permitted to opt out of a pro-
posed class when the court does not have personal jurisdiction over the plaintiff"); see
also NEWBERG & CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1.15, at 1-41 (1992) (stating
that Shutts determines the level of process due "in order for a court to exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction over nonresident and absent class members").
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protects a defendant from being haled into an out-of-state forum to
defend herself upon pain of a default judgment; in contrast,
an absent class action plaintiff is not required to do anything. [S]he
may sit back and allow the litigation to run its course, content in
knowing that there are safeguards provided for his protection....
Because States place fewer burdens upon absent plaintiffs than they
do upon absent defendants in nonclass suits, the Due Process
Clause need not and does not afford the former as much protection
from state-court jurisdiction as it does the latter.
28
Yet the conclusion that absent plaintiffs are entitled to less pro-
tection than absent defendants does not mean they are left without
any protection from the dangers of distant forum abuse. Justice
Rehnquist pointed out that
It] he Fourteenth Amendment does protect "persons," not "defend-
ants" so absent plaintiffs are entitled to some protection from the
jurisdiction of a forum State which seeks to adjudicate their
claims.... [D]ue process requires at a minimum that an absent
plaintiff be provided with an opportunity to remove himself from
the class by executing and returning an "opt-out" or "request for
exclusion" form to the court.
2 9
This specific reference to the rights of absent plaintiffs may imply
that the opt-out requirement in Shutts merely protects absent plaintiffs
from the dangers of distant forum abuse. Reading Shutts in this lim-
ited way, however, will prevent the Court from relying on the case as
precedent regarding the constitutionality of mandatory classes in gen-
eral. The Court, instead, will have to look for other sources of author-
ity, and it will likely turn to the purpose of litigation in our country
and our procedural values for guidance.
III. THE PURPOSE OF ADJUDICATION
Much has been written about the dangers of mass trials in mass
tort cases. Prior to the 1950s courts uniformly refused to certify class
actions, largely out of concern that the interests of the individual
would be trampled in a large-scale proceeding. The advocates of ag-
gregative techniques, however, have increasingly gained ground
against the defenders of individual litigant autonomy.30 "[A] mass of
claims, attorneys with divided loyalties who are buffeted by conflicting
incentives, and judges who try to administer a kind of bureaucratic
28 Shutts, 472 U.S. at 810-11.
29 Id. at 811-12.
30 SeeJohn C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95
COLUM. L. REv. 1343, 1344-45 (1995).
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justice"3 1 have replaced individual claims, private attorneys, and tradi-
tional judging.
Whether mandatory classes are a constitutional and appropriate
procedural tool for complex civil litigation depends upon which pro-
cedural values one privileges.3 2 The Supreme Court's analysis of the
shift from traditional two-party disputes to "masses of claims" and "bu-
reaucratic justice" will eventually determine the fate of the mandatory
class action.
A. The Purpose of Adjudication Is to Protect the Rights of Individuals
Advocates of "individual control" derive support for a right to opt
out from a number of sources. One source is our tradition of individ-
ual rights which dates back to the founding of our country and is
rooted in the Declaration of Independence. A second source of sup-
port for individual claim autonomy is the ideal of participation urged
by Professor Lon Fuller.
1. Liberty and Democracy
Our political tradition establishes individual claim autonomy as
an important personal right and responsibility.33 This ideal of individ-
ual control originated in the larger political and social commitment to
autonomy and freedom which characterized the founding of our na-
tion. Thomas Jefferson, the principal author of the Declaration of
Independence, profoundly believed that government should be based
on popular consent and that its purpose was to secure the "inaliena-
ble" rights of man.34 Under Locke's social contract theory, to which
Jefferson enthusiastically subscribed, all people have the right to resist
a ruler when she manifestly abuses her power (that is, falls to adhere
to the principles of the natural law).35 Jefferson relied upon Lockean
31 Roger H. Transgrud, Conflict of Laws and Complex Litigation Issues in Mass Tort
Litigation: Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 69, 86.
32 See Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative
Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theoy of Value, 44 U.
Cm. L. Rav. 28 (1976).
33 See Transgrud, supra note 31, at 74.
34 See GARRETT WARD SHELDON, THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THOMASJEFFERSON
142 (1991).
35 See LORD LLOYD, LLOYD'S INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 103 (M.D.A. Free-
man ed., 6th ed. 1994). Jefferson borrowed extensively from John Locke, a propo-
nent of the idea of the "social contract" and "natural rights." Locke believed that men
existed in an idyllic natural state of freedom governed only by a "law of nature" "writ
in the hearts of all mankind." Id. According to Locke, men were willing to give up
part of this idyllic liberty, join a civil society, and submit to a sovereign in return for
1997] 1635
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principles when he articulated in the Declaration of Independence a
vision of "freedom from arbitrary, tyrannical government" and a gov-
ernment defined by "free, equal, and independent individuals pos-
sessed of natural rights who must legitimately submit only to limited
authority to which they consent in order to protect their material self-
preservation. '3
6
This moral presupposition of individual dignity, and its political
counterpart, self-determination, permeated all social and political in-
stitutions, including the law.3 7 For example, the founders guaranteed
a right to due process in the Bill of Rights to ensure individual liberty:
To accord an individual less [than a right to a "hearing" or "to be
heard"] when his property or status is at stake requires justification,
not only because he might contribute to accurate determinations,
but also because a lack of personal participation causes alienation
and a loss of that dignity and self-respect that society properly
deems independently valuable.
38
Notions of liberty and autonomy not only influenced the develop-
ment of substantive law, but also served as the ideological foundation
for our procedural system. Our tradition of individual autonomy is
present in our most bedrock procedural decisions. One example of
this commitment to individual control in our procedural system is the
"master of the complaint rule" whichJustice Holmes articulated in The
Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co.39 That case states the fundamental
procedural rule that "a party who brings a suit is master to decide
what law he will rely upon."4° While notions of liberty originated in
political and social thought at the time of the founding, they tran-
scended politics to influence the most basic principles of our legal
system.
rights to property, with property defined as any piece of nature with which a man
mixes his labor. Because the community merely transferred the power to enforce the
natural law to a sovereign, the right of the sovereign to govern was contingent upon
adherence to the natural law and to consent by the governed. "The fundamental law
of Nature being the preservation of mankind, no human sanction can be good or
valid against it." Id.
36 SHELDON, supra note 34, at 142. See generally THE DECLARATION OF INDEPEN-
DENCE (U.S. 1776).
37 Mashaw, supra note 32, at 49-50.
38 Id. at 50.
39 228 U.S. 22 (1913).




A second argument in favor of individual claim autonomy is the
ideal of participation urged by Professor Lon Fuller. Traditionally our
legal system has encouraged injured parties to participate in their law-
suits because this seemed the best way to achieve substantive justice.
Two examples of procedures designed to encourage individual party
participation are (1) the rule that an injured party must assert her
own claim and (2) the adversarial model of adjudication.
An injured individual is, in virtually all cases, solely responsible
for asserting her own claim; neither the government nor some third
person may assume this responsibility. Professor Fuller in his article
The Forms and Limits of Adjudication articulates the two important rea-
sons for this requirement.41 First, proceedings initiated by an arbiter
are tainted with preconceptions about what happened and what the
consequences should be. Justice is best served when the arguments of
counsel suspend the case between two opposing interpretations of it,
leaving the arbiter time to explore all the nuances of the case before
reaching a decision. If the arbiter initiates the proceedings, the effec-
tiveness of the adversary presentation, and the litigants' participation,
is diminished.42 The second reason injured parties must initiate their
own claims is that legal actions often adjudicate the rights of people
with respect to agreements or contracts whereby each benefits from
the other. The interpersonal nature of most claims dictates that the
claimant herself initiate the adjudication. Personal responsibility for
one's claim, therefore, both furthers substantive justice and accommo-
dates the inherently personal nature of most claims.43
A second example of our procedural system privileging individual
claim autonomy is our traditional paradigm of adjudication: the two-
party adversarial system. The adversarial system is the primary way we
preserve an individual's right to be heard and encourage participa-
don. Professor Fuller identifies the "distinguishing characteristic of
adjudication ... [as] the fact that it confers on the affected party a
peculiar form of participation in the decision, that of presenting
proofs and reasoned arguments for a decision in his favor."44 For
Fuller, optimal adjudication consists of two partisan advocates present-
ing arguments to a neutral arbiter and asking her to decide their dis-
pute. The now-emerging nature of complex civil litigation, where the
41 See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353
(1978).
42 See id. at 383, 387.
43 See id. at 387.
44 1& at 364.
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party structure is amorphous and the judge plays an active role rather
than being a neutral arbiter, contradicts Fuller's view of adjudication.
He predicted the difficulties this new structure would present: "Fail-
ure generally attends the attempt to dispense with the distinct roles
traditionally implied in adjudication."45
The nature of mandatory class actions would offend Professor
Fuller's notion of adjudication still further. Although mandatory class
plaintiffs participate in the litigation as class members, denying them
a right to opt out prevents them from presenting their particular facts
and reasoned arguments to the court and from choosing an advocate
best able to represent them in the adversary process. Although a
mandatory class plaintiff may get a day in court, it is not her day in
court. As Professor Fuller points out, "[w]hatever destroys the mean-
ing of [the affected party's] . . . participation [in the decision by
proofs and reasoned arguments] destroys the integrity of adjudication
itself."46
Advocates of individual claim autonomy use the individual rights
tradition and the benefits of participation in the adversary system to
argue against mandatory classes. They believe that mandatory classes
violate not only basic tenets of our legal system, but also the core be-
liefs that form the foundation of American society-liberty and
democracy.47
B. The Purpose of Adjudication Is Group and Public Fairness
If mandatory classes offend the foundational principles of our
country and risk violating due process, why were they created and why
have they survived?
As previously mentioned, until the mid-1950s the traditional ad-
versarial model remained in force: courts, out of concern for individ-
ual interests, refused to certify mass tort class actions. However,
proponents of the mandatory class action have gained ground be-
cause of the increasingly widespread belief that our traditional model
fails in complex cases. Class action cases today may involve tens of
thousands of plaintiffs and even more relevant issues and facts; for
45 Id. at 383.
46 Id. at 364.
47 The equitable bill of peace, which courts have used throughout history to col-
lectively adjudicate the rights of individuals, see supra text accompanying notes 25-26,
seems to undermine the premise that our procedural tradition privileges individual
claim autonomy. Acknowledging, however, that at times judges have developed pro-
cedural shortcuts, does not discredit the argument that our political and legal tradi-
tion, on the whole, requires that the goal of adjudication be to protect individual
rights.
1638 [VOL. 72:5
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each of these plaintiffs to bring her own claim would overwhelm our
judicial system. As discovery begins, more issues yield more facts
which in turn yield more issues; the result is an infinite geometric
expansion. Meanwhile, as time passes, both public and private re-
sources are lost to this abyss.
The inadequacy of the adversarial model in massive, complex
cases gave rise to a new litigation model which Professor Abram
Chayes termed "public law litigation."48 A "sprawling and amor-
phous" party structure which negotiates and mediates at every step,
and a judge who is not neutral, but rather the dominant figure in
organizing and guiding the case, have replaced the traditional para-
digm of two partisan advocates representing two parties before a neu-
tral arbiter.
49
The evolution of public law litigation has led to a new definition
of fairness. Judge Newman, CircuitJudge for the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, calling for "a fundamental rethink-
ing of what we are trying to accomplish" articulated the goal: "a broad-
ened concept of fairness-one that includes fairness not only toward
litigants in an individual case but also to all who use or wish to use the
litigation system and to all who are affected by it."5° Rather than
merely serving individuals, attorneys and judges should seek substan-
tive justice for group interests and the public good.
Mandatory class actions are essential to achieve this broader con-
cept of fairness. Class actions in which there is a risk of inconsistent
results cannot be adjudicated any other way: it is impossible to both
merge and keep separate two organizations or to distribute uniform
bonuses according to conflicting plans.5 ' Also, as Professors Miller
and Crump have noted, "[b]y definition it is impossible to resolve sep-
arately individual claims involving common rights or limited funds."
5 2
The distribution of a limited insurance fund illustrates the need for
unitary disposition: to use the fund in one way in one state and a sec-
ond way in another would destroy policyholders' mutual rights.55
Seeking greater fairness for classes as a whole, judges have ex-
panded the limited fund theory into a theory of "constructive bank-
ruptcy" so that it now applies in virtually any complex case with the
48 Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REv.
1281 (1976).
49 See id at 1284.
50 Jon 0. Newman, Rethinking Fairness: Perspectives on the Litigation Process, 94 YALE
LJ. 1643, 1644 (1985).
51 See Miller & Crump, supra note 21, at 41.
52 IRL at 40.
53 See id. at 40-41.
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potential for large recoveries. If aggregate potential recoveries
threaten to exceed a company's net worth, its assets are often consid-
ered to be a limited fund.54 Without a mandatory class, the first few
plaintiffs to reach the courthouse could collect huge damage awards
and deplete the defendants' assets, leaving the majority of the plain-
tiffs unable to recover for their injuries. Similarly, courts have also
developed a "punitive damage overkill theory."55 Because state law or
constitutional doctrines such as the Eighth Amendment and the Due
Process Clause may limit the amount of punitive damages a court can
levy against a defendant, the first plaintiffs to receive judgments might
exhaust all available punitive damages. In constructive bankruptcy
and punitive damage overkill cases, advocates of mandatory classes ar-
gue that individual fairness results in no fairness at all.
Public law litigation, then, responds to the inadequacies of the
traditional adversarial model. It transforms never-ending cycles of
fact-finding and issue development into cases with cognizable parame-
ters. It strives for fairness to all parties involved and to the public and
the judiciary who bear the costs of overwhelming complex litigation.
The traditional adversarial model preserves autonomy and individual
participation while the new public law model aims, for Judge New-
man's "broader conception of fairness" by protecting group and pub-
lic interests.
IV. EFFICIENCY
In addition to the academic debate about the merits of individual
autonomy versus group fairness, the Supreme Court must consider
the practical impediments to adjudicating enormous complex cases.
Efficiency issues often collapse into concerns about "group" or "sys-
tem" fairness, as adjudicating the rights of one class is usually more
efficient than adjudicating the rights of many individuals. In some
cases, however, individual control may best promote effi-
ciency;56consequently, this Note addresses efficiency concerns sepa-
54 See In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, 960 F.2d 285, 292 (2d Cir. 1992);
Miller & Crump, supra note 21, at 41-42.
55 In re Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 725 F.2d 858, 861-62 (2d Cir. 1984); In
re "Agent Orange", 100 F.RD. 718, 728 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
56 Parties who maintain control over their claims will be motivated to litigate
more effectively than those who are removed from (and thus indifferent to) the trans-
actions; ownership fosters responsibility and accountability. Leaving control of claims
to injured parties prevents victims from being harassed by those seeking to buy the
right to litigate the claims. Also, economic decisions are best made by the true owner
of property rather than by any other person. Finally, parties often litigate or settle
claims based on a variety of personal considerations; if plaintiffs retain control over
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rately. This section introduces two balancing tests which weigh the
strengths of competing interests such as individual autonomy, group
fairness, and efficiency. These tests offer a third, more flexible way for
the Court to resolve the mandatory class issue: it could adopt one of
these tests and leave judges to determine, depending on the costs and
benefits in particular cases, when a mandatory class does or does not
offend due process.
A. The Four-Factor Test
One possible way to address the policy concerns of advocates of
both individual control and group fairness is to weigh the strengths of
competing interests such as (1)efficiency, (2) equity, (3) the danger
of distant forum abuse, and (4) the interest in individual control of
the case. This four-factor test, proposed by Professors Miller and
Crump, can help determine in individual cases when a court can cer-
tify a mandatory class without offending due process.57
The four factors reflect policies both for and against mandatory
class certification. Efficiency and equity usually argue in favor of
mandatory class certification. Mandatory classes promote efficiency
because courts can adjudicate class claims less expensively and more
quickly than they can adjudicate multiple individual lawsuits. They
also prevent opt-outs from inefficiently "free-riding" on the invest-
ment of the other plaintiffs who remain in the class.58
Mandatory classes may also promote equity by ensuring that simi-
lar claims are adjudicated similarly and that a defendant's assets are
spread equally among all injured plaintiffs. Denying individual plain-
tiffs a right to opt out often yields more consistent treatment for all
members of the class: no one member can race to the courthouse to
seek a personal judgment and deplete funds that might have been
available to the class as a whole.
In contrast to efficiency and equity concerns, a danger of distant
forum abuse will always weigh heavily against the certification of a
mandatory class. If, as in Shutts, there is a danger of plaintiffs being
the settlement or trial of their particular claim, they can obtain the outcome which
best reflects their personal views. See Transgrud, supra note 31, at 75.
57 See Miller & Crump, supra note 21, at 55-56.
58 One common example of a class action free rider problem is potential plain-
tiffs who excuse themselves from a class suit to wait on the sidelines for a final deci-
sion on the merits. Then, if the judgment is favorable, the self-excluded class
member can assert nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel and secure a judgment
against the defendant without any effort, expense, or risk. If, on the other hand, the
judgment was unfavorable to the class, the individual litigant can bring her own suit as
she would not be bound by the judgment.
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haled into a distant forum, it is likely that an individual's due process
rights will outweigh considerations of efficiency and equity. A plain-
tiff's interest in individual control, determined by factors such as the
uniqueness of her facts or her reasons for wanting her own counsel,
will also weigh against mandatory class certification.
Because a party will always have an interest in individual control
and the public will always have an interest in judicial efficiency, the
factors of equity and distant forum abuse are likely to be the most
helpful in using the four-factor test to determine whether mandatory
class certification is appropriate. If there is a limited fund or a chance
that individual suits could yield inconsistent adjudication in violation
of mutual rights, equity concerns are great and mandatory class certifi-
cation may be appropriate. Similarly, if a state is trying to exercise
jurisdiction over absent plaintiff class members who lack minimum
contacts with the forum, the danger of distant forum abuse may pre-
vent mandatory class certification.
Ultimately, if the traditional concerns of judicial efficiency and
equity weigh heavily in favor of class certification, and the additional
requirement of sufficient contacts with the forum is met, then under
the four-factor test the court is justified in overriding a party's right to
individual control of her own litigation by certifying the class.
59 If
however, as in Shutts, there is a danger of distant forum abuse and a
loss of individual control of the litigation, most courts will decline to
certify a class under one of the mandatory provisions.
B. Efficiency and the Mathews v. Eldridge Test
A second balancing test to determine the amount of process due
to a class action plaintiff is the Mathews v. Eldridge60 cost comparison.
Mathews held that in deciding how much process is due to someone
complaining that the government has deprived him of his property,
the courts should consider the value of the property, the probability
of erroneous deprivation because the particular procedural safeguard
sought was omitted, and the cost of the safeguard.61 In a mandatory
class action, the property at stake is the individual's chose in action, a
constitutionally recognized property interest. To prevent a litigant
from pursuing her chose in action individually is to deprive her of the
difference in value between what she could have recovered as an indi-
vidual minus what she will recover as a class member ("the value of the
right to opt out"). The probability of erroneous deprivation is the
59 See Miller & Crump, supra note 21, at 55.
60 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
61 See id. at 334-35.
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probability that the plaintiff will receive less as a member of the class
than she would receive in individual litigation. Finally, the cost of the
safeguard is the risk of loss to the other plaintiffs that results from the
individual being permitted to opt out of the class (more specifically,
the possibility that the first few plaintiffs may collect all the punitive
damages or exhaust the defendant's funds leaving the other plaintiffs
with no chance to recover) and the increased private and public costs
that accompany the individual adjudication of multiple claims.
Judge Posner points out that in Hand Formula terms, due process
is denied when B < PL62 where B is the difference in the value of the
chose in action between individual and class litigation, P is the
probability that the amount the plaintiff would recover as a class mem-
ber is less than what she would recover in individual litigation, and L
is the risk of loss and additional costs to the other plaintiffs and the
public that accompany a class member's right to opt out. As with the
Hand Formula itself, it is virtually impossible to quantify the terms in
Posner's efficiency formula.63 This equation, however, provides a use-
ful way to balance the value of an opt-out right to a class member
against (1) the cost of an opt-out right to other plaintiffs and the pub-
lic, and (2) the danger that mandatory class certification will deprive
the plaintiff of a chance to recover as fully as possible. Posner's use of
efficiency as a baseline provides an alternative to holding mandatory
class certification unconstitutional or constitutional in every instance;
depending on the costs and benefits involved, denying a right to opt
out may or may not deny a litigant due process.
In mandatory class cases, the value of the right to opt out, or the
interest in individual control, is high; in a race to judgment, individual
plaintiffs who reach the courthouse first might be able to recover the
lion's share of the punitive damages and are assured that there will be
funds available to pay compensatory damages. As a member of a
mandatory class, however, the plaintiff would have to share both puni-
tives and compensatory damages with the other class members, result-
ing in a much smaller recovery. Although the value of the right to opt
out may be high if the plaintiff wins the race to judgment, the cost of
the procedural safeguard-the other side of the equation-probably
still outweighs the plaintiff's potential increase in recovery. Every ad-
ditional dollar the plaintiff recovers will be a dollar subtracted from
the amount left for distribution to the class. Therefore the cost of the
procedural safeguard, the right to opt out, is at least as high as the
62 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 549-50 (4th ed. 1992).
63 Id.
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plaintiffs increased recovery. In addition, individual litigation in-
creases both the public and private costs of adjudication.
In cases where punitive damages are not available and the poten-
tial recovery for plaintiffs is small regardless of whether they sue as
individuals or as members of the class, the value of the right to opt out
is significantly reduced. In these cases, Posner's other two factors, the
costs of the procedural safeguard and the probability that a plaintiff
will be denied the true value of his claim, almost certainly outweigh
the value of the right to individual control. The costs of the fight to
opt out include the reduction or elimination of the ability of the rest
of the class members to recover for their injuries. Also, the individual
lawsuits brought by opt-outs may increase the costs of litigation for the
plaintiffs and the defendants and increase the burden on the court.
Finally, the probability that a person wishing to opt out will be
deprived of the full value of her claim (her property interest) by being
forced to remain in the class is difficult to ascertain: whether a person
will recover more fully by being permitted to opt out depends upon
her place in the race to judgment. If an opt-out is first to the court-
house, she may recover more fully than she would have as a class
member. On the other hand, if she is not first, she may recover less
than she would have as a class member because the right to opt out
has permitted fellow opt-outs to deplete available assets.
V. CONCLUSION: PRESERVING INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY
IN THE FACE OF CONTRARY COLLECTIVE ACTION
The constitutionality of mandatory class actions will depend upon
which procedural values the Supreme Court chooses to privilege. The
language of Shutts provides no clear answer as to whether the Due
Process Clause requires that litigants be given an opportunity to opt
out of a class. The Court may choose to read Shutts as a guarantee of
the right to control one's own litigation or, alternatively, it may find
the case largely inapposite.
In the absence of precedent, the Court will turn either to the
purpose of adjudication in our country or to an efficiency analysis to
decide the fate of mandatory class actions. Between these two op-
tions, the Supreme Court should look to the purpose of adjudication
and privilege the tradition of individual autonomy. It should hold
mandatory classes unconstitutional in all cases.
The efficiency approach is inadequate because it fails to properly
safeguard an individual's constitutional rights. If judges properly ap-
ply either the four-factor test or the Mathews v. Eldridge test, they
should, in every instance, find mandatory classes unconstitutional.
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The cost of depriving an individual of her right to control her chose
in action, that is, adjudicating her rights without allowing her to have
her day in court, outweighs any pragmatic benefits of a mandatory
class action. Efficiency, the weighing of costs and benefits, though, is
often confused with expediency. The Court, to foreclose the possibil-
ity thatjudges will sacrifice individual rights for the sake of expediency
must adopt a per se rule prohibiting mandatory class certification. As
Professor Mashaw has suggested, principles of individual dignity,
equality, and tradition are better value theories for due process than
efficiency: "it is not clear that the utilitarian balancing analysis asks the
constitutionally relevant questions."
64
If, to avoid the dangers ofjudicial discretion, the Supreme Court
decides to adopt a per se rule regarding mandatory classes, it must
decide whether the purpose of adjudication is to protect individual
rights or to further group fairness. It is ironic that the best argument
in favor of mandatory class actions is "system" fairness; as John Rawls
argues, through obedience to system, and the subjugation of individ-
ual interests (the pursuit of "formal" rather than "individual" justice),
we hope to treat similar cases similarly and achieve more consistent,
fair results overall.65 The irony is that Professor Fuller, perhaps the
strongest advocate of the traditional, adversarial two-party model, also
privileges "system"; Fuller, however, argues that a lawyer owes a duty
to the adversarial system, the integrity of the adjudicative process it-
self.6 6 He characterizes lawyers as guardians of due process, one of
the fundamental processes of self-government "upon which the suc-
cessful functioning of our society depends."67
While a commitment to the protection of individual claim auton-
omy will increase the number of lawsuits, and in some cases lead to
similar plaintiffs being treated differently, we must look for ways other
than depriving litigants of their right to control their chose in action
to remedy this problem. Ultimately, the constitutionality of
mandatory class actions is a choice between pragmatism and individ-
ual rights. To further group or public justice at the expense of an
individual's right to control her own chose of action threatens the
64 Mashaw, supra note 32, at 48.
65 SeeJOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OFJUSTICE 58, 235-39 (1971).
66 See Fuller, supra note 41, at 382-85.
67 Id. at 384.
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purpose of the due process guarantee: to ensure "individual liberty in
the face of contrary collective action. 68
Patricia Anne Solomon*
68 Mashaw, supra note 32, at 48.
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